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GEORGE L. HASKINS
MORRIS S. ARNOLDt
George Haskins grew up in the American Cambridge, the son of
renowned medievalist Charles Homer Haskins. His introduction to the
law of property, so far as the record reveals, came early on when he
and his brother, while at play, were accused by Dean Pound of trespassing on the grounds of the Harvard Law School. George proffered
two defenses: one, that his father was dean of the College of Arts and
Sciences, the other that the ground on which he and his brother were
playing was public. Pound demurred and phoned the boys' father. As is
often true of complex cases, no judgment is entered in this one. But in
any event, the incident may be responsible for George's keen interest in
implied licenses, prescriptive easements, the Roman law of jus spatiandi, and the recondite difficulties of the trespasser ab initio.
All of George Haskins' students and colleagues know that his intellect is prodigious, but not very many know that he was a child prodigy: his first book, his Phi Beta Kappa Essay, was published by the
Harvard University Press just after his twentieth birthday.' Not even
his famous father could equal that feat. Naturally, so accomplished a
young man as this found himself in demand; but, although reared in
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the shadow of the Harvard Law School, George resisted the blandishments of that institution and others, and joined the faculty of the University of Pennsylvania Law School. It is from that school that he now
retires after almost forty years as Professor of Law.
George's. accomplishments in the interim are, naturally enough,
numerous. His bibliography of ten books and eighty-two articles, still
expanding at this writing, bears witness to his energy and creativity.
Perhaps others will chronicle in detail his contributions to legal scholarship, but some general words on what makes his point of view special
seem also to be in order.
When George began writing about legal history in the 1930's, his
was not exactly a vox clamantis, but he was nevertheless one of a literal handful of people who were working in the field of legal history.
Over the years, as interest grew in liberalizing legal education, history
courses became more common in law school curricula. Still, too often
what was served up was a variety of antiquarianism that really did not
deserve the name "history." George knew that, properly conceived, a
course in legal history ought not to be a course in old law: it ought to
be about comparative law in time. Today, no doubt, this is taken for
granted, but not so many years ago such talk was of a revelatory character. But let George speak for himself. The task of the legal historian,
he said, "is not merely one of recounting the growth and jurisdiction of
courts and legislatures or of detailing the evolution of legal rules and
doctrines." 2 He went on to explain:
It is essential that these matters be related to the political
and social environments of particular times and places.
Broadly conceived, legal history is concerned with determining how certain types of rules, which we call law, grew out
of past social, economic, and psychological conditions, and
how they accorded with or accommodated themselves
thereto.'
Such views as these were virtual heterodoxy at the time George expressed them. All of us are in his debt for advancing these kinds of
insights.
It is sometimes difficult not to make tributes like these sound like
eulogies. In this case, however, there is no such problem. Although
George is occasionally given to bucolic musings about retiring to Maine
to learn another skill (pumping gas is frequently mentioned), his colG.
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leagues have other plans for him. We doubt very much that there is
anyone who is as much at home with both American and English legal
sources as George is. We believe that there is no good reason why
George, now freed from teaching and administrative duties, should not
devote full time to research and writing. Austin Wakeman Scott,
George's fellow Cantabrigian, is the person that we have selected as the
proper role model (you should pardon the fashionable phrase) for
George Lee Haskins. Mr. Scott was in his office every day, twenty
years and more after his retirement, pounding and kneading his treatise
into shape, correcting proofs, and generating pocket parts. George has
already shown the world that he is a Precocious Toddler.4 Now we
confidently look forward to his new incarnation, in a decade or so, as
Fertile Octogenarian.'

" Cf. Re Gaite's Will Trusts, [1949] 1 All E.R. 459 (Ch.) (the case of the "Precocious Toddler," in which The court assumed that a child under the age of five could
have children).
5 Cf. Jee v. Audley, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (Oh. 1787) (the case of the "fertile octogenarian," in which the court presumed for purposes of the Rule Against Perpetuities
that an eighty-year-old woman was capable of having additional children).

